Showing posts with label M1. Show all posts
Showing posts with label M1. Show all posts

Friday, February 9, 2018

9/2/18: Money Velocity and Signals of Households Leverage Risks


Fed has a problem, folks. Not a new one, but a very, very persistent one: velocity of money.

Here is the data:

What does this mean? The velocity of money is defined as the frequency at which a unit of currency is used to purchase domestically-produced goods and services within a given time period. As FRED database states, "it is the number of times one dollar is spent to buy goods and services per unit of time. If the velocity of money is increasing, then more transactions are occurring between individuals in an economy."

The Fed measures this parameter across three metrics:

  • M1, the narrowest component of money which covers currency in circulation (notes and coins, traveler’s checks, demand deposits, and checkable deposits. "A decreasing velocity of M1 might indicate fewer short- term consumption transactions are taking place. We can think of shorter- term transactions as consumption we might make on an everyday basis."
  • The broader M2 includes M1 plus saving deposits, certificates of deposit (less than $100,000), and money market deposits for individuals. Comparing the velocities of M1 and M2 provides some insight into how quickly the economy is spending and how quickly it is saving. When M2 is above M1, there are net savings being accumulated in the economy.
  • Per FRED: "MZM (money with zero maturity) is the broadest component and consists of the supply of financial assets redeemable at par on demand: notes and coins in circulation, traveler’s checks (non-bank issuers), demand deposits, other checkable deposits, savings deposits, and all money market funds. The velocity of MZM helps determine how often financial assets are switching hands within the economy."
So here is what we have as of 4Q 2017:
  • M1 velocity stands at 5.488, lowest reading since 1Q 1973 and 48.6 percent below pre-crisis highs. Which is in part probably reflective of the reduced importance of physical cash in our payments systems, but is also indicative of shrinkages across demand deposits money - the stuff we have in our bank accounts. Note: demand deposits capture electronic transactions, so changes in physical cash spending are offset by changes in electronic cash spending;
  • M2 velocity is now 26 quarters running below pre-crisis peak, down 35.1 percent on pre-crisis highs. The metric rose in the last quarter to 1.431 from 1.427 in 3Q 2017, but the levels are still below 1Q 2016. Which suggests that savings are weak.
  • Broadest money velocity is at 1.299, unchanged on 1Q 2016 and below pre-crisis highs for the 40th quarter running. The indicator is barely off historical lows of 1.295 achieved in 2Q 2017. MZM velocity is currently 63.4 percent below pre-crisis highs.
  • Finally, the gap between the M2 and M1 velocities (a measure of savings) is at negative 4.1 which indicates dis-saving in the economy.

Patently, there are no signs in this data of any positive Fed QE impact on households' balances or propensity to spend. Equally, there is no sign of a serious balancesheet recovery for the households. Yes, the rate of dissaving has fallen from M2-M1 velocity gap of 8.7 around 2007-2008 to current 4.1, but that still implies no deleveraging. Longer term U.S. households financial wellbeing remains under water, with only less liquid assets, such as property and financial investments underpinning household assets and no significant savings cushion held in liquid assets forms.

Equally patent is the fact that the traditional indicators of forward inflationary pressure (e.g. money velocity) are not quite in agreement with the measured inflation (which has exceeded the Fed target four months in a row now and has been beating analysts' expectations over the last three months). The only way the two figures can be reconciled is via increased debt levels on household balances sustaining consumption growth. Not a great sign for the future, folks.


Monday, July 28, 2014

28/7/2014: Of Savings, Cash and Hedge Funds...


The current crisis, on monetary aggregates side, can be characterised by the rising prevalence of cash over savings. In other words: shrinking stock of credit and deposits relative to cash.

The current crisis, on media commentary side, can be characterised by the endless talk about high savings rates in the private sector.

Here is the problem: savings = inflows into stock of savings (aka, deposits) or investment or divestment out of loans (including forced restructurings, bankruptcies, insolvencies and foreclosures). We know that Irish investment is not growing at the rates worth even mentioning. Which means that Either deposits should be growing to reflect 'high savings' or debt should be shrinking.

Take a look at the difference between M3 money supply and M1 money supply.

By definition:

  • "Money Supply (M1) to euro area -M1 is the sum of overnight deposits and currency issued (this comprises the Central Bank's share of euro banknotes issued in the Eurosystem, in proportion to its paid-up shares in the capital of the ECB, plus coin issued by the Bank less holdings of issued euro banknotes and coin by the MFI sector). " 
  • "Money Supply (M2) to the euro area -M2 is the sum of M1 plus deposits (with agreed maturity of up to 2 years; redeemable at notice of up to 3 months and Post Office savings bank deposits)."
  • M3 is M2 plus deposits with maturity over 2 years.
So the gap between M1 and M3 is deposits.


The M3-M1 gap has fallen since the onset of the crisis. It has fallen along the steady trend line, with some volatility around the dates of banks recapitalisations. And it continues to fall. In fact, between December 2013 and May 2014 we have the longest uninterrupted decline in deposits in history of the series. Current level of the gap is sitting only EUR7 billion above the all-time historical record low. In fact, during this 'historically high savings rates' period, Irish monetary system has managed to reduce the stock of deposits, compared to pre-crisis levels, by EUR85.91 billion.

But while savings (deposits) are falling, 'savings' (debt deleveraging) is all the rage:


You can see what has been happening in the Money Supply territory and private credit here:


With all of these 'high savings' promoted by the official statistics and 'new lending' promoted by the Banking Federation, the Central Bank is now officially giving up on getting those 'repaired and recapitlaised banks' to lend into the real economy (something they were supposed to do since early 2009 - based on the promise of the October 2008 Guarantee, then since early 2010 - based on the various Government programmes, then since first half 2011 - based on the banks recaps and PCARs, then since 2012, based on Government programme agreed with the Troika, then since early 2013, based on Government spin of a turnaround in the economy...). Instead of hoping for the Pillar Banking System to miraculously come back to life, the Central Bank is opening up the floodgates for the hedge funds (here courtesy of fire sales of assets by Nama) to lend into economy, despite the fact that such lending is considered to be a high-risk activity. Nothing like selling pennies on the euro and then celebrating euros on pennies debt reload...


Wednesday, May 21, 2014

21/5/2014: Irish Credit Supply to Cash Ratios are Heading South, Still

Irish Central Bank and Government departments have been pushing hard to convert Irish economy into cashless, electronic accounting data storehouse, where everything gets counted and taxed (at least in theory).

Meanwhile, in Ireland's real economy, cash remains the king as the only metric of money supply still expanding in the deleveraging hell gripping the financial system:



To remind you: in Q4 2013, Irish private households' deposits fell to their lowest point since March 2009 (note, this makes them the lowest since around Q3 2005 as current figures reflect addition of the Credit Unions deposits to the dataset (they were not counted in until January 2009).

That's right... let's do away with cash so Irish banks deposits get another superficial (accounting) boost and few million worth of tax euros flows into the state coffers. Happy times all around... we know Irish households are getting richer and richer by day...

Tuesday, February 4, 2014

4/2/2014: Good at anything? Europe's broken monetary policy engine


Monetary policy is not a nuclear science. It is not even anatomy, for what it matters. Instead, it is more like a simple task in civil engineering. Bank of Japan can get the message, the Fed wrote books on it, Bank of England has discovered it, Canadians, Swedes, Danes, Swiss, everyone has figured it out by now... Meanwhile, in the euro area, there is a whole lot of mystery, mystique, halls of mirrors and corridors of contortions, when it comes to the monetary policy. And a simple, plain-sight visibility of its failure…

Take a look at this chart, plotting euro area real GDP growth against M1 money supply growth rate (via Pictet):


Spot anything of interest? Oh, simples.com: M1 growth declines predate GDP growth and levels declines. No, seriously, since 2006, euro area could not manage one policy - money supply. Forget the intricacies of fiscal policy (it is not an easy job to spend money on stimulating economic activity, when you are in debt up to your ears), the EU simply could not put enough money into the real economy to prevent cash in circulation from shrinking.

How on earth can such a feat be achieved? Simple: the ECB pumped trillion euros plus into the banks, instead of pumping the very same trillion (and more still would have been needed) into the real economy. Frankfurt opted for loading money into the banks balance sheets . It should have opted for using printed money to pay down real economy's debts (households' and non-financial companies' debts) which would have (1) repaired banks balance sheets, and (2) repaired the real economy, restarting consumption and investment. Instead, we have a bizarre, senile, idiotic situation where we print money and then, de facto, lock it up in the vaults.

It would half as bizarre if it was just locking the liquidity in the vaults, but the euro area monetary policy is currently all about the repayments by the banks of the LTROs, or in different terms - burning of cash out of the economy. This is cutting down on M1 growth rate. Just as the M1 growth should be rising, not falling. Forget about doing the right thing at the wrong time… we are doing the wrong thing at the wrong time… and doing so repeatedly.

And the latest? Annual growth rate of M3 money supply is again slowing, to 1.0% y-o-y in December 2013 from already low 1.5% y/y growth in November. The law of under fulfilled low aspirations clearly at work: expectation was for 1.7% y/y growth in M3, and ECB delivered 1.0% - the lowest rate since September 2010. Oops, predictably, lending to the private sector remained at -2.3% y/y in December 2013, an all-time low.


So for all its OMT, LTROs, BU 'policies activism', the ECB is now 5th year into mismanaging basic crisis-related monetary policy. Inventiveness and monetary engineering gushing out of Mario Draghi left, right and centre to the delight of the policy analysts and bonds salesmen, and the euro area is still where it was: below reference line on M3 growth.